15 August 2007

History repeating itself

In 2005/2006, economist Wade Locke projected provincial revenues from Hebron using the existing royalty regime. He assumed an average price per barrel of oil of US$50 and based the calculation on the 500 million barrels in the Hebron field alone.

Ben Nevis and West Ben Nevis with their 250 million barrels weren't included in the last round of talks.

Locke put the estimate at $8.0 to $10.0 billion over the 20 year lifespan of the project.

Let's assume an average price for oil of US$70 per barrel. That would add about 40% to the original projection. In other words, without an "equity" stake or superroyalties, a Hebron deal signed today under the existing royalty regime would generate $11.2 to $14 billion for the provincial treasury. It would also oull the better part of the estimated $3.0 to $5.0 billion construction costs into the province as well since the biggest part of the fabrication - the concrete base for the platform - would be built in Newfoundland.

That's right. Just by changing the numbers used in the calculation, the provincial government appears to make more money. Danny Williams could accept the January 26, 2006 frmaework agreement, forget equity and supperroyalties and still look like a giant winner.

Essentially that's what happened between the $1.4 billion upfront cash offer from Ottawa on offshore handouts and the $2.0 billion Danny Williams accepted in January 2005.

The feds just assumed a different average price per barrel of oil. The number went up by $600,000 and Danny Williams settled for a deal that was fundamentally the same one he rejected three months earlier. In fact, in a media interview in January 2005, Danny Williams admitted the whole thing came down to a discussion of what the up front cash - the quantum - would be.

What exactly are the odds that might happen on Hebron, the second time around?

-srbp-